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1 Introduction  
It has been argued that: “foresight activities have a limited theoretical basis and respond to 
practical needs of exploring the future. At present a gap can be perceived between innovation 
theory and foresight practice, i.e. there is not specific framework available that would combine 
both” (Weber, Schaper-Rinkel, & Butter, 2009). Foresight is a well-established field of practice and 
more recently an emerging academic field. The most academic foresight literature is descriptive or 
normative and relates to the practice of foresight (Miles, Harper, Georghiou, Keenan, & Popper, 
2008). However, it is generally acknowledged in the literature that there is gap between practice and 
theory in foresight (Barré & Keenan, 2008; Hideg, 2007), and recently literature has discussed the 
possible ‘theoretical underpinning’ of foresight and possible theory building in foresight (Fuller & 
Loogma, 2009; Öner, 2010). This paper suggests that such underpinnings can be found in the 
innovation-system framework.  
 
Taking the innovation-system framework as theoretical underpinnings and rationale of foresight can 
be understood as further embracing already ongoing trends within foresight. Firstly, foresight 
research increasingly recognizes that foresight is highly context dependent, and that context 
specificities must be accounted for (Barré, 2002; Cariola & Rolfo, 2004). Despite its importance, 
such work is currently limited (Schoen, Könnölä, Warnke, Barré, & Kuhlmann, 2011). Secondly, 
foresight exercises most often do not take sufficient notice of the demand for knowledge, existing 
competences, and the reality and wishes of firms are not adequately emphasized (Smits, Kuhlmann, 
& Shapira, 2010). We argue that the innovation-system framework can supply foresight with a 
coherent argument and methodology for including contextual factors and focusing more on demand. 
 
Our main argument complements and contributes to several recent developments in foresight 
research. (1) The nexus between foresight and innovation systems have been tentatively explored by 
others, but they have mainly focused on how foresight can contribute to innovation-system analysis 
(Alkemade, Kleinschmidt, & Hekkert, 2007; Cagnin, Amanatidou, & Keenan, 2011; Martin & 
Johnston, 1999) while we are interested in how the innovation-system framework can contribute to 
foresight. (2) Others have explored practical applications of an integrated framework of innovation-
system analysis and foresight (Dachs & Weber, 2010). This paper is concerned with a more 
foundational type of integration, not application. (3) A systems approach to foresight is not unique. 
Recently an explicit systems approach to foresight has emerged (Saritas, 2011). This work, though 
profound, is mainly about complex systems in general. It is not focused on innovation or the 
innovation-system framework. Our work adds an innovation focus to this work. In general though, 
there is according to Smits, Kuhlmann, & Shapira (2010) only litte communication between 
innovation-system research and foresight, and the linkages between them remain embryonic and 
underdeveloped. This paper can be seen as an attempt to further their integration. Its contribution is 
a detailed analysis of how the two areas are already intimately related, and suggestions for further 
integration. Our paper focuses on foresight for public policy. Our target groups are mainly foresight 
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scholars that are concerned with innovation (not exclusively science and technology) but also as an 
introduction of foresight for interested innovation scholars.  
 
The paper is conceptually explorative. It aims to make two main points. First, we will do a literature 
review of innovation studies and one of foresight studies. The reviews show that foresight already 
has theoretical foundations in innovation studies, and has coevolved with the area since its birth. 
Hence, theoretical underpinning already exists. Our reviews make the latter explicit which helps us 
to illustrate linkages and suggest how further integration can take place with respect to the research 
needs in foresight mentioned above. Secondly, we explore potential implications for foresight 
(mainly in the planning phase) of accepting the innovation-system framework as its explicit 
theoretical basis. We suggest implications for: (i) the goal of foresight, (ii) system definition 
method, (iii) degree of participation, (iv) and method for mapping of system. These considerations 
leave us with a range of points for further research. Both of these points constitute contributions to 
the literature. 
 
The structure of the paper is as flows. Chapter 2 will present a review of innovation studies with 
focus on the results achieved by this field of research and on how it has changed. It concludes by 
presenting the innovation-system approach, and generations of innovation policy. The purpose is to 
define a contemporary conceptual framework for understanding innovation that can be used to link 
up with foresight. Chapter 3 will present, conceptualize and define the issue of foresight. It will 
present different generations of foresight and point out areas of current development. Given the 
latter we argue that there is a good argument for considering closer integration between foresight 
and innovation-system research. Subsequently we suggest the term ‘innovation-system foresight’ as 
a concept to aid such integration. In chapter 4, we will discuss the preliminary implications of 
accepting innovation-system foresight as a way forward. Chapter 5 contains concluding remarks.  
2 Innovation through time: review of innovation studies 
2.1 Generations of innovation dynamics  
Since innovation studies emerged in the 1960s a large body of knowledge about innovation has 
accumulated, and researchers have gradually better understood the nature of innovation. At the 
same time the ‘mode of innovation’ has changed over time such that researchers in principle have 
been dealing with a ‘moving target’. As a result it is possible to identify successive generations or 
models of innovation (Dodgson, Gann, & Salter, 2005; Rothwell, 1994)1
                                                 
1 The reviews referred to in the following has a clear historical focus on innovation in USA, Europe and Japan. It is thus not 
globally representative.  
. The generations reflect 
changes in:  (i) the sources of innovation, (ii) the nature and complexity of the process, and (iii) how 
well we have understood (i) and (ii).  
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2.1.1 1st generation – the science-push model  
Prior to World War 2 (WW2) science wasn’t in general seen as relevant for production and 
economic wealth., but this changed immediately after the war due to inter alia the role of science in 
winning it (Lundvall & Borrás, 2005). The economic recovery in the USA and Europe was partly 
based on the emergence of new industries with close links to science (for example semiconductors, 
pharmaceuticals, and electronic computing). The public opinion was positive towards the role of 
science as a provider of solutions to societal problems. Given these circumstances it is hardly 
surprising that innovation was mainly perceived as a linear process from scientific discovery 
through technological development in firms, and finally to the market place. The latter is known as 
the linear model. The core assumption was that more R&D, the more successful new products. 
Besides a few exceptions the transformation of scientific output to technology and innovation was 
largely ignored (Rothwell, 1994). 
2.1.2 2nd generation – the demand-pull model  
In the mid 1960s focus was on growth, productivity and large scale industry (concentration ratios 
increased). New products were still being introduced, but these were mainly based on alternations 
of old rather than on new technological opportunities. Employment growth rates were stagnating, 
and due to a less expansionary environment competition between firms intensified. There was a 
change of focus from scale of production towards productivity and efficiency of production. The 
intensified competition created a stronger focus on marketing as a means to win market shares. This 
situation influenced the perception of innovation in a direction where demand-side factors played a 
more prominent role. Here the market was seen as a cradle for ideas that could orient R&D efforts 
which consequently was given a ‘reactive role’. On this basis the 2nd generation or ‘market pull’ 
innovation model was launched (Rothwell, 1994).    
2.1.3 3rd generation – the couplings model 
The 1970s were a period of economic crisis where production capacity exceeded the demand for 
goods. Firms in general adopted a defensive strategy with focus on market consolidation and 
rationalization. According to Rothwell (1994) and Dodgson et al. (2005) this context stimulated a 
more profound interest in discovering the sources of innovation which gave rise to a number of 
detailed empirical studies2
                                                 
2  Rothwell (1994) refers to: (Cooper, 1980; Hayvaert, n.d.; Langrish, Gibbons, Evans, & Jevons, n.d.; Myers & Marquis, 
1969; Rothwell et al., 1974; Rothwell, 1976; Rubenstein, Chakrabarti, O’Keefe, Sonder, & Young, 1976; Schock, 1974; 
Szakasitz, 1974; Utterback, 1975). 
. These basically found that both the science-push and the market pull 
models were extreme and atypical for innovation processes. Instead the studies showed that 
innovation most often is a process of interaction between technological opportunities and market 
needs. Innovation was now seen as a process consisting of distinct but interacting and 
interdependent stages as e.g. continuous processes of feedback between design, product 
development, production, and marketing with varying links to the science and research community. 
Hence, focus was on interactions between phases and actors (Kline & Rosenberg, 1986; Rothwell, 
1994). The model thus combines supply-push and demand-pull perspectives. One conclusion was 
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that though science is essential to innovation it is often not the initiating step. Instead, it is 
employed at all points along the process of innovation, as needed. Hence, the role of science can 
best be understood as both a leader and a follower in innovation (Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993).  
2.1.4 4th generation – the integrated model 
The early 1980s saw a period of economic recovery where firms were increasingly and explicitly 
aware of the strategic importance of developing and using new (generic) technologies. In this 
context the rise of information and communication technologies (ICT) were central to developing 
new types of products and organization. Meanwhile the global outlook of firms increased and the 
notion of a global strategy became common as the number of both domestic and international 
strategic alliances grew. The rise of Japanese firms in the 1980s was central to changes in 
innovation studies. It became clear that they were superior in innovation, and ‘western’ firms started 
to look for inspiration in the Japanese product development system which was characterized by 
short product life cycles and low production costs. According to Rothwell (1994) this performance 
was based on their ability to in an early phase integrate firm-external and -internal actors in product 
development processes simultaneously. Here the stages of the innovation process are not seen as 
sequential but rather as mutually integrated (in parallel) which implies intensive communication of 
information and knowledge between actors. Hence, this model describes more complex information 
flows within the firm and with multiple sources of innovation as knowledge bases, users, producers, 
universities and other partners (Dodgson et al., 2005).  
2.1.5 5th generation – the systems model 
During the 1990s firms increasingly value knowledge and creativity, and became more skilled in 
innovation management. The fifth generation model is characterized by the introduction of ICT 
systems that are able to speed up the innovation processes. Rothwell (1994) formulated this as that 
the technology of technological change was itself changing because ICT has the capacity to speed 
up parallel and integrated processes of innovation (via faster/better communication). This further 
intensifies the features of the 4th generation model. The strategic environment for firms became 
further globalized and increasingly took the shape of a network economy where firms are mutually 
interdependent. Here value increasingly stems from connectedness to networks rather than 
ownership of capital (Dodgson et al., 2005). Innovation is thus becoming more of a networking 
process involving strong and early vertical linkages, use of electronics-based design and 
information systems, and horizontal linkages (joint R&D and strategic alliances). On this basis 
Rothwell defines innovation as process of know-how accumulation (learning process) involving 
elements of internal and external learning. 
   
The  5th generation innovation model reflect fundamental changes in the dynamics of capitalist 
market economies reflecting the emergence of the ‘learning economy’ (Lundvall & Johnson, 1994). 
Here knowledge is the most important factor for economic performance and learning the most 
important process. The main point is that not only has knowledge become more important, but what 
is truly novel in our time is the speed with which economically useful knowledge changes. A 
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learning economy is an economy where the ability to learn is crucial for the economic success of 
individuals, firms, regions and national economies. In the learning economy increasing complexity, 
competitive pressures and ‘limitedness’ of firm knowledge imply that firms need to collaborate, 
because the innovation-relevant knowledge is distributed across a range of actors and knowledge 
bases in society (Foss & Foss, 2002). Hence, innovation is best understood as a distributed and 
systemic process where firm-external knowledge and learning are crucial factors. The growing 
importance of firm-external linkages suggests a systems approach to understanding innovation 
which focuses not only on the performance of individual firms, but also on how they are embedded 
into complex social and economic relationships in their environments - the latter points to an 
innovation system framework (Smith, 1999). The generations of models are in many ways the 
micro foundations for the innovation-system approach which brings together the most important 
results from four decades of innovation studies.  
2.2 Innovation Systems 
The core topic of innovation-system research is to understand the interaction between technological 
change and economic performance, which often takes place via international competitiveness. The 
approach emphasizes the interdependence between technical and institutional change as the central 
theoretical area (Freeman, 2003)3
 
. The focus on institutions is important because it draws attention 
to patterns of interaction and to how they differ across contexts.  
Text box 1 illustrates a range of diverse but complementary definitions of an innovation system. It 
is obvious from these definitions that especially institutions, organisations and their interactions are 
the main factors that determine the IS4
2.2.1 Different levels and boundaries 
. This paper will rely on the broad and basic definition given 
by Lundvall who defines an innovation system as “the elements and relationships which interact in 
the production, diffusion and use of new, and economically useful knowledge” (Lundvall, 1992). It 
is further stressed that such a system is a social and a dynamic system. Within an innovation system 
the most centrally placed type of organization is most often the firm because firms are responsible 
for production and for improving production via introduction of new knowledge.  
When the innovation-system approach emerged it was in the form of a National Innovation System 
(NIS) concerned with how nations can build knowledge infrastructure for economic development 
(Lundvall, 1992; Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993). Since, the framework has developed in different 
directions because not all found the national level appropriate.  
                                                 
3 Institutions are defined as sets of common habits, routines, established practices, rules, or laws that regulate the relations 
and interactions between individuals and groups (Edquist & Johnson, 1997). A main point is that institutions provide an 
incentive structure for human behavior, which in turn will determine the attainable economic outcome in a given context 
(Sokoloff & Engerman, 2003). This structuring view of institutions underlies the often-used phrase that institutions are the 
rules of the game. They facilitate the regulation of social behavior which supplies stability to societies – a stability that is 
mandatory for its reproduction. Institutions mainly affect innovation via their effect on interactive learning. This refers to 
how institutions influence the way communication, interaction and knowledge sharing take place in society 
4 Organisations and institutions are seen as distinct although they interact and affect one another. Organisations are actors 
such as firms, universities and states. Institutions on the other hand influence how actors behave. 
 
 
8 
 
 
The latter diversity covers different levels and dimensions as the regional IS (RIS) (Asheim & 
Gertler, 2005; Cooke, Uranga, & Etxebarria, 1997), the sectoral IS (SSI) (Malerba, 2002, 2005) and 
the technological IS (TIS) (Bergek, Hekkert, & Jacobsson, 2008; Carlsson & Stankiewitz, 1995).  
 
 
The different approaches reflect that an IS may be delimited (i) spatially, (ii) sectorally or (iii) 
according to technology/knowledge base. These determinants of limits may be applied in a mix and 
may all be fruitful given the object of the research because they complement rather than exclude 
each other. The flexibility in defining innovation system level and boundaries comes from seeing 
the economy as an evolving complex, open system – a recursive system (Arthur, Durlauf, & Lane, 
1997). The latter implies that innovation systems interact and are mutually interdependent, and that 
every system is embedded in a broader social system, see figure 1. 
 
 
Text Box 1: Definitions of an innovation system (Lundvall, Joseph, Chaminade, & Vang, 2009). 
 
The different approaches reflect the diversity of innovation dynamics that we can observe in the real 
world. Innovation dynamics differ across contexts because: (i) industries depend on different 
knowledge bases, and the technological opportunities differ across knowledge bases as a 
“... The network of institutions in the public- and private-sectors whose activities and 
interactions initiate, import, modify and diffuse new technologies” (Freeman, 1987). 
 
“... The set of institutions whose interactions determine the innovative performance of national firms” 
(Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993). 
 
“... The national system of innovation is constituted by the institutions and economic structures 
affecting the rate and direction of technological change in the society” (Edquist & Lundvall, 1993). 
 
“... A national system of innovation is the system of interacting private and public firms (either 
large or small), universities, and government agencies aiming at the production of science and 
technology within national borders. Interaction among these units may be technical, commercial, 
legal, social, and financial, in as much as the goal of the interaction is the development, 
protection, financing or regulation of new science and technology” (Niosi, Saviotti, Bellon, & Crow, 
1993). 
 
“... The national institutions, their incentive structures and their competencies, that determine the 
rate and direction of technological learning (or the volume and composition of change generating 
activities) in a country” (Patel & Pavitt, 1994). 
 
“... That set of distinct institutions which jointly and individually contribute to the development 
and diffusion of new technologies and which provides the framework within which governments 
form and implement policies to influence the innovation process. As such it is a system of 
interconnected institutions to create, store and transfer the knowledge, skills and artifacts which 
define new technologies” (Metcalfe, 1995). 
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consequence of existing strongholds in production, science and technology; (ii) technological and 
innovation competences, embodied in people and firms, are unequally distributed across space and 
time as a consequence of specialization of industrial structure and of education system; (iii) the 
quality and volume of demand for output differs across industries which results in diverse demand-
pull effects (Dosi, 1988). Moreover, institutions relating to patents, appropriability conditions, 
competition and market structure differ in importance across industries (Nelson & Rosenberg, 1993; 
Pavitt, 1984). These insights generate an argument saying that innovation is a context-dependent 
phenomenon, and that therefore should avoid ‘unnecessary’ aggregations and generalizations. 
 
 
Figure 1: System overlap, interaction and interdependency (A. D. Andersen, 2011). 
2.2.2 A theoretical core 
Despite diversity within the approach a basic theoretical core can be identified. The central building 
block is evolutionary economics (Johnson, Edquist, & Lundvall, 2003).  The main ontological 
consequences are: (i) absence of equilibrium assumptions. An economic system never fully reaches 
equilibrium; it is always characterized by disequilibria, change and ‘structural tensions’ – dynamics 
first (Dahmén, 1989; Nelson, 1995); (ii) social systems evolve over time in a path-dependent 
manner which is characterized by positive and negative feedback mechanisms (Arthur, 1994); (iii) 
The individual is understood as subject to ‘bounded rationality’ and limited information-processing 
capacity, which makes choices and search local rather than global (Simon, 1983); (iv) consequently 
innovation follows certain, and different, trajectories across time and space (Dosi, 1982). Hence, 
one should expect diversity in systems across time and space, and not identical systems. Other 
characteristics shared by the IS approaches that are not directly derived from, but compatible with 
an evolutionary stance are: (v) that knowledge is different from information, and that parts of 
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knowledge are tacit and others are localized (result of path-dependent learning) (Winter, 1987); (vi) 
knowledge and information are shared and flow in relationships between actors; (vii) knowledge is 
a result of learning, and learning is predominantly interactive (Nooteboom, 2000); (viii) knowledge 
and learning are inputs to innovation, which is a fundamental factor in economic development 
(Boulding, 1981). 
 
A pivotal proposition in the innovation-system framework is that the most central activity in an 
innovation system is learning and that learning is mainly interactive (Johnson, 1992). Nooteboom 
(2000) argues that as competition, specialization, and in turn complexity increase, the value of firm-
external knowledge increases, which makes interactive learning the most important type of learning. 
The explicit introduction of interactive learning to innovation studies came in the form of user-
producer interaction (Lundvall, 1985). Lundvall argues that innovation emerges from a 
confrontation of user needs with technological opportunities. Users naturally know more about their 
own needs than producers, and producers know more about technological opportunities than users. 
This situation entails interdependence in innovation endeavors between users and producers via 
exchange of information and interactive learning. This inter alia implies that (i) communication 
skills and ability to identify problems and possibilities on behalf of both users and producers 
become very important; (ii) avoiding system lock-in situations is as important as creating new ones 
systems; (iii) the competence of users (of knowledge) is as important as the competence of 
producers (of knowledge). Despite being crucial for interactive learning the latter is often neglected 
(Laestadius, 1998, 2000)  On a more aggregated level the quantity and quality of interactions 
between organizations in an economy are likely to improve the ‘efficiency’ of innovation activities 
and performance of the innovation system (Fagerberg, Mowery, & Verspagen, 2009; Lundvall, 
1985).  
 
As we have seen the innovation-system framework systematically links the features of the 5th 
generation model, and partly on that basis builds a tentative theoretical framework that can be used 
to explain and understand the relations between science, technology, innovation and economic 
performance. There is significant diversity within this innovation-system tradition but it is beyond 
the scope of this paper to explore.  
2.3 Generations of innovation policy 
As the understanding of innovation processes have improved and as the mode of innovation itself 
has changed, the rationale for policy intervention to stimulate innovation activity has also changed. 
Lundvall and Borrás (2005) identify three ideal types of innovation policy in the post WW2 period: 
(a) science policy, (b) technology policy, and (c) innovation policy5
                                                 
5 These ideal types are difficult to precisely pinpoint in time but they are rooted in different policy rationales that are related 
to the changing understanding of innovation.  
. (a) The type of innovation 
policy pursued immediately after WW2 is characterized as science policy which basically relies on 
the first generation linear model of innovation. Science is seen as capable of solving the problems 
of society. With this perspective the most important activity is basic science and the most relevant 
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actors are universities and research institutions. (b) During the 1960s the rationale behind science 
policy evolved into technology policy which emphasizes the links to industry. The objective 
changed from being about more science, to addressing economic objectives. Attention moves 
beyond basic science towards engineering, and from the internal organization of universities toward 
how they link to industry. The change of emphasis reflects an increasing role for the demand side in 
the innovation process (elements of the 2nd and 3rd generation models), and thus includes several 
other elements as firms, industrial policy, technology transfer and private R&D institutes. The shift 
clearly reflects a critique of the linear model. (c) The innovation policy ideal type is derived from 
the insight that innovation is a systemic process. Here innovation policy basically concerns all 
relevant aspects of society that influences the process of innovation which makes policy systemic. 
Besides the importance of science and technology transfers to industry, the innovation system 
approach is concerned with the building of firm-internal capabilities and the increasing number of 
firm-external couplings relevant for innovation. Hence, innovation policy is concerned with the 
couplings and interactions between the parts of the system6
 
.  
The systemic and distributed character of innovation has implications for participation in policy-
making processes. It has been recognized that effectiveness (implementation) of policy to a large 
extent depends on the involvement of a broad range of actors besides those formally in charge. Due 
to the complexity of the learning economy, policy formulation relies on the knowledge, experience 
and competence of stakeholders. Since policy-makers cannot be understood as perfectly informed 
social planners distributed policy-making via inclusion of key stakeholders is the only sensible 
alternative. Moreover, often it is these stakeholders who must alter behavior for policies to be 
implemented. Hence, for policies to be effective participation of stakeholders in the process of 
policy development is needed (Ahlqvist, Valovirta, & Loikkanen, 2012). The latter implies that 
broad inclusion has a strong instrumental value for innovation policy.  
2.4 Overview   
The review above have illustrated that the understanding of innovation has broadened over time. 
Table 1 illustrates the generalized characteristics of the different generations of innovation models. 
These models of innovation coexist. Even though the pure science push and market pull models 
hardly exist then one can talk of a balance leaning towards one of these models (Dodgson et al., 
2005). Table 1 also links the generations of innovation models with the different types of innovation 
policy. It is obvious that as the concept of innovation broadens, the parameters considered relevant 
for innovation policy increase in number. In this sense the 5th generation model contains all the 
other generations that would each constitute special cases of the 5th generation. The ideal of 
systemic innovation policy that emerged with the 3rd generation only gradually took hold, and was 
continuously developed from that point forward.  
 
                                                 
6 One can say that the rationale for (a) and (b) is market failure while the rationale for (c) is both market failure and 
system failure which refers to failures in e.g. institutions or couplings – factors that go beyond the market (Lundvall 
& Borrás, 2005).  
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An important point stemming from the review is that innovation policy can and should incorporate 
science policy and technology policy in order to coordinate these interdependent dimensions of an 
innovation system. The division of labor between these dimensions can be broadly be described by 
three overlapping and continuously ongoing subprocesses: (i) production of knowledge; (ii) 
transformation of knowledge into artifacts; and (iii) matching of artifacts, and market needs and 
demands (Pavitt, 2005), see figure 2. 
 
Generation  1st  2nd  3rd  4th  5th  
Name  Science push  Demand pull Coupling or chain-
linked model 
Integrated model  Systems model 
Background  Optimism on behalf 
of science 
The growing 
importance of 
marketing  
Crisis and scarce 
resources – more 
research on 
innovation  
Infusion of learning 
about innovation 
success in Japan  
Intensified 
globalization of 
markets, finance 
and R&D;  
Time  1950s - mid 1960s Mid-1960s – early 
1970s 
Early 1970s – mid 
1980s  
Mid-1980s – mid 
1990s 
Mid 1990s – 
present  
Key character-
istics 
 
 
View on the 
process 
The innovation 
process runs from 
science and R&D 
to the market.  
 
It is linear and 
sequential. 
The innovation 
process runs from 
the market needs to 
science.  
 
It is linear and 
sequential. 
Technological 
opportunities and 
market needs 
interact in non-
deterministic ways. 
The process seen as 
sequential, but with 
feedback loops 
(non-linear) 
Designed 
manufacturability; 
 
Integrated and 
parallel processes of 
innovation and 
development. 
Requires intensive 
information 
exchange. 
Open; distributed; 
networking, system; 
internal and 
external learning; 
 
Innovation as 
process of know-
how accumulation 
and learning  
Policy ideal 
type 
Science policy Technology policy Innovation policy  Innovation policy  Innovation policy  
Table 1: Generations of innovation models and policy (developed by authors). 
 
There is no a priori hierarchy between these processes. Their mutual interdependence is illustrated 
by the two-way arrows (interactive learning). ‘Science systems’ are an important factor, but most 
countries are (relatively) weak in this respect, and there is not always a clear cut relation between 
e.g. investments in science, R&D and in turn innovation and economic performance (Freeman 
1995). Therefore focusing primarily on the science and technology system can result in misleading 
policy conclusions (Johnson, Edquist et al. 2003; Lundvall 2007).  
 
Despite the diversity in innovation models and policy rationales they are not equally valuable for 
understanding innovation, diagnosing problems and prescribing solutions. The sources and 
processes of innovation have changed over time, and the innovation-system approach (and 
innovation policy) must be understood as analytically superior to prior models.       
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Figure 2: Dimensions of innovation systems and policy – developed from (Lundvall & Borrás, 2005; Pavitt, 2005). 
3 Foresight  
In the complexity of the learning economy governments, universities and firms must make 
decisions about investments in innovation in an increasingly unpredictable environment. At the 
same time (public) knowledge production is increasingly exposed to tighter budgets (relative to 
number of investment areas) and public governance which implies accountability and social returns 
on investment in science. The situation has generated an increased demand for information about 
how to distribute scarce resources and prioritize knowledge areas to support innovation, which 
involves qualified anticipation of future parameters for international competitiveness (Georghiou, 
2001). Hence, as the learning economy has become more pronounced the number of foresights has 
increased continuously since the 1980s (Butter, Brandes, Keenan, & Popper, 2008).  
 
The purpose of foresight is not to predict the future but to imagine alternative futures and their 
consequences, and on that basis engage in informed decision-making. Foresight thus rests on two 
key assumptions: (i) that the future is not laid out, (ii) and that decisions and actions taken today can 
affect the future. Foresight can be defined as a systematic, participatory, future-intelligence-
gathering and medium-to-long-term vision-building process aimed at enabling present-day 
decisions and mobilizing joint actions (EFP, 2012). It is important to note that in this perspective 
foresight is perceived as a process where new insights emerge and capabilities are built (in 
participants) rather than a tool for prediction (Wiek, Binder, & Scholz, 2006). Moreover, it is 
important to stress that the essential rationale and motivation for (public policy) foresight is 
ultimately social and economic development by linking science and technology policy more 
effectively to wealth creation (Martin & Johnston, 1999) – with innovation as the main lever. 
 
The understanding and content of foresight is has changed over time. These changes have been 
motivated by changing rationales for actually doing foresight and broadening scope of application 
areas, which in turn has generated a vast diversity in methods applied in foresight exercises. These 
Innovation system: matching artefacts with user demands 
Innovation policy  
 
Science and technology system: transforming  
knowledge into artefacts. 
Technology policy 
 
 
Science system: knowledge production 
Science Policy 
Continuous and overlapping 
processes – no hierarchy. 
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factors have coevolved and made it possible to identify different generations of foresight (Miles et 
al., 2008; Schlossstein & Park, 2006; Tegart & Johnston, 2004). Before reviewing the generations it 
is helpful to uncover the roots of foresight because these are explanatory factors of the latter 
changes. 
3.1 Roots of foresight  
(1) Foresight is rooted in an American technological forecasting (or simply forecasting) tradition 
which was mainly developed in relation to strategic military studies at the RAND corporation in the 
USA during the 1940s and 1950s (Jantsch, 1967). Technological forecast is often associated with 
making probabilistic assessments about the future which makes accuracy a critical parameter (P. D. 
Andersen & Rasmussen, 2012). The fact that these methods did not predict the oil crises of the 
1970s generated significant skepticism about the usefulness and validity of forecasting (particularly 
in periods of radical change) which in turn stimulated the development of other approaches (Miles, 
2010).    
 
(2) According to Miles (2010) foresight is also rooted in a European tradition of futures studies 
(Bell, 2003, 2004) established in the 1960s and 1970s. The field of futures studies tends to be 
dominated by professionals from social sciences and the humanities and is seen as an art involving 
creative and imaginative thinking and acting (Martin, 1995).  Moreover, the early futures studies 
tradition was characterized by a pessimistic and critical point of view on the future and on 
technology, and that this partly formed the foundation of the tradition of technology assessment. 
Compared to forecast, futures studies were more focused on stimulating public debate while 
forecast was an instrument for concrete decision making (Miles, 2010).  
 
(3) Technology assessment is intended to analyze risk, costs and benefits related to the 
introduction of a specific technology or the management of it, and convey this information to the 
public, politicians and other decision makers. Citizen participation in discussions about desirable 
developments and types of technologies is an important aspect of technology assessment. This 
distinguishes technology assessment from forecast and futures studies that both tend to be elitist and 
expert-focused (P. D. Andersen & Rasmussen, 2012). 
 
(4) The inspiration for the first formulation of foresight partly came from Japan around 1980 (as 
did innovation studies stimulus) whose ‘technological forecasting’ was markedly different from 
what was going on elsewhere. Martin (2010) characterizes it as: (i) not only involving a few experts 
but thousands of scientists, industrialists, governments officials and others; (ii) it considered the 
demand side of future economic and social needs; (iii) it combined top-down and bottom-up 
elements; (iv) and it emphasized process-benefits. This led Irvine and Martin (1984) to propose the 
term foresight as a strategic forward-looking technology analysis to be used as a public policy tool 
in priority setting in science and technology (Irvine & Martin, 1984). It was defined in opposition to 
‘hindsight’ – understood as analysis of the historical process and origins of certain important 
technological innovations. 
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Since Irvine and Martin (1984) foresight has established itself as a field of practice in both public 
policy making and in corporate strategic planning, and more recently as a scientific discipline. It has 
been characterized by increasing conceptual broadening and diversity. The latter reflects 
experimentation with and application of diverse rationales as foundation for foresight. It has 
become more participatory, complex and is applied at multiple levels and in numerous dimensions 
(Luke Georghiou, Harper, Keenan, Miles, & Popper, 2008). 
3.2 Generations of foresight  
With a focus on national foresights in the United Kingdom Miles, Harper, Georghiou, Keenan, and 
Popper (2008) have identified broad changes in the understanding and practice of foresight that they 
translate into five generations of foresight. The changes are predominantly motivated by the 
changes in the underlying rationale for doing foresight. Rationales for foresight have co-evolved 
with the progressing understanding of the causalities between science, technology, innovation and 
economic development that has taken place in innovation studies (Smits, Merkerk, Guston, & 
Sarewitz, 2010).  
3.2.1 1st generation – science foresight  
The 1st generation of foresight basically consists of technological forecasting, which is the domain 
of technological experts with focus on natural science and engineering as main disciplines. It is 
concerned with accuracy of predictions which is understood as an essential part of a science and 
technology transfer (to society) policy (Georghiou, 2001). The latter reflects a linear model of 
innovation. Moreover, it reflects an understanding of both innovation and the future as being 
phenomena that can be predicted. The core rationale for this type of foresight is based on the linear 
model of innovation, and leads to 1st generation innovation policy with a strong focus on basic 
science (science policy). Thus, it is suitable to label this practice as ‘science foresight’.    
3.2.2 2nd generation – technology foresight  
The 2nd generation of foresight is characterized by the recognition that the demand for technology 
must be taken into account in order to successfully transfer scientific knowledge to industry. 
Representatives from industry are now included among the key actors in the foresight process along 
with scientists, and actors who are able to bridge the gap between them (Georghiou, 2001; Miles et 
al., 2008). The changes from the 1st generation of foresight to the 2nd correspond to the progress 
made in innovation studies conceptualized as the demand-pull model and parts of the couplings 
model of innovation. The latter reflects the move towards technology policy, and we can label this 
practice ‘technology foresight’. 
3.2.3 3rd generation – towards a systems approach     
The 3rd generation model is characterized by a ‘broadening’ of the market perspective by inclusion 
of a wider set of actors. Its emergence was inspired by foresight activities in Japan where especially 
the use of bottom-up inputs and process benefits were noted (Martin, 1995; Miles, 2010). Insights 
from innovation studies implied that foresight practitioners started to take onboard a more complex 
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and non-linear view of innovation7
 
. It was recognized that there were insufficient ‘bridging 
organizations’ in the socio-economic system, and foresight began to be seen as an arena for making 
the necessary network connections (Miles et al., 2008). The latter was the first sign of a systems 
approach which implied a broadening of the actors that could be considered relevant to include in 
foresight. Hence, 3rd generation foresight adds social stakeholders such as voluntary organisations, 
consumer groups, pressure groups etc. It also increasingly emphasized socio-economic problem 
solving as an organizing principle rather than scientific opportunities (Georghiou, 2001). These 
changes imply that the policy ideal moved towards a systemic ideal and closer to what we have 
described as ‘innovation policy’.  
The 3rd generation model was formulated in the mid 1980s and gradually evolved throughout the 
1990s. In 1999 the innovation-system approach rationale was explicitly linked to foresight as a tool 
for ‘wiring up’ innovation systems by stimulating, extending and deepening interactions (Martin & 
Johnston, 1999). Even though a general systems rationale emerged the link between the innovation-
system approach and foresight was, and still appears, embryonic. Still, the change of emphasis 
implied that foresight was increasingly seen as a process of linkage and vision building (process 
benefits) and less as a predictive planning tool (Cariola & Rolfo, 2004).  
3.2.4 4th and 5th generations – increasing diversity, complexity and uncertainty 
Even though the broad fault line between a systemic and non-systemic perception of science, 
technology and innovation is located between the 2nd and 3rd generations of foresight Miles et al. 
(2008) have further identified 4th and 5th generations of foresight that unfolded in the 2000s.  
 
In the 4th generation foresight starts to have a ‘distributed role’ which implies that more diverse 
type of organizations are conducting foresight, and that more diverse stakeholders are identified as 
relevant participants. It takes on a coordinating role for multiple stakeholders and activities. 
Moreover, multiple organizations finance or perform foresights according to own needs and 
interest8
 
.  
The 5th generation covers a diversity of foresights levels, locations, dimensions, methods, design 
and rationales. Often (at a national level) they are concerned with: (i) molding structures or actors 
within science, technology and innovation; and (ii) the science and technology dimension of 
broader social or economic issues. The latter can also be conceptualized as a focus on the (S&T 
dimension of) Grand Challenges9
                                                 
7 It is worth noting that Irvine and Martin were located at SPRU (UK) which was also a center of excellence for innovation 
studies in the 1970s and 80s and which served as a cradle for the innovation-system approach. 
. The increasing conceptual broadening and diversity of foresights 
8 This point must be understood as stemming from a UK context which started as singular and national-level public 
foresights, and then gradually was performed by a range of actors.   
9 The issues covered by the term ‘grand challenges’ include various, mainly supra-national, concerns around e.g. the 
environment, food security and resource depletion that are difficult or even impossible to solve by single agencies or 
through rational planning approaches. The link to innovation policy comes from a political desire of reorienting public-
funded science to address these challenges, and it thus functions as a prioritizing tool. By this policy makers (mainly in 
Europe) hope to excel in science, solve global problems and stimulate economic growth (Cagnin, Amanatidou, & Keenan, 
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reflects experimentation and coexistence of diverse rationales. This implies that current foresight 
practice has gone well beyond what is conceptulized as technology foresight (Butter et al., 2008) 
wherefore the broader term ‘foresight’ is more appropriate.  
 
Another feature of the 2000s is the explicit emergence of a systems approach to foresight10
 
 which 
inter alia argues that foresight shouldn’t understand phenomena as separated from their historical, 
spatial and social context (Saritas, 2011). Though profound, the work by Saritas (2011) is tentative 
and mainly about the general nature of complex systems without referring to the innovation-system 
framework. Others have addressed the obvious couplings between innovation systems and 
foresight, but they have mainly focused on how foresight can contribute to innovation-system 
analysis (Alkemade et al., 2007; Cagnin et al., 2011; Martin & Johnston, 1999) while we are 
interested in how the innovation-system framework can contribute to foresight. Some have 
moreover explored practical applications of an integrated framework of innovation-system analysis 
and foresight (Dachs & Weber, 2010) but without addressing implications of integration of the 
theoretical roots. Hence, even though a systems or an innovation-system approach has come to 
dominate the general thinking about innovation within the foresight community (Weber, Havas, & 
Schartinger, 2011), the conceptual linkages are still immature/underdeveloped. 
Above we have presented a historical review of the evolution of foresight, and indicated that it has 
been inspired by results achieved in innovation studies. In general the five generations of foresight 
models should be understood as complementary and coexisting ideal types that most likely do not 
exist in pure form. Still, they reflect a trajectory of development within foresight which reflects a 
shift from a linear perception of innovation towards a systemic framework. This shift is far from 
over, though, which is exemplified by that foresight practitioners tend to overestimate the 
power/impact of foresight as a result of underestimating the complexity of innovation (Eriksson & 
Weber, 2008). This implies that several research frontiers/gaps within foresight reflect that it is 
gradually incorporating the insight that innovation is a systemic, context-dependent, complex, 
uncertain and interactive process. Also, some authors have called for an update of foresight 
rationales because it is currently lacking behind the developments in social science (Barré & 
Keenan, 2008). The latter constitutes a motivation for suggesting deeper integration with the 
innovation-system framework.  
3.3 Innovation-system foresight 
The process of shifting the underlying perception of innovation in foresight generates a number of 
research challenges within foresight research that would suggest a deeper integration with the 
innovation-system framework. We will here focus on three specific and one general issue. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                  
2012). The trend is partly motivated by the growing need to justify public research funding and the increasing pressure on 
universities to comply with their 3rd mission role. 
10 Even though a systems rationale had long since been accepted, the actual systematic application of this insight has only 
emerged recently.  
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Firstly, it is increasingly recognized that foresight is highly context dependent such that it 
influences both the foresight process and its potential impact on innovation activity (Barré, 2002; 
Cariola & Rolfo, 2004). Foresight is taking on board the insight that innovation dynamics differ 
markedly across contexts (Dosi, 1988). Foresight must be able to systematically and coherently 
include such diversity to say anything sensible about innovation. The contextual nature of 
innovation is being recognized but actual work on this issue is lacking (Schoen et al., 2011). 
Support can be found in the innovation-system framework. Secondly, it has been argued that 
foresight should increasingly move from being about priority setting towards being more focused 
on implementing insights and realizing structural change (Edler & Georghiou, 2007). Lacking 
(demonstrable) impact of foresight  has increased focus on demand in the innovation process (Smits 
& Kuhlmann, 2004). The argument is that including demand more seriously will increase impact 
(Georghiou & Cassingena Harper, 2011). In nature, the argument is similar to that of distributed 
innovation policy. The innovation-system framework, where the user and the quality of demand are 
equally important to supply of knowledge, can guide foresight on how and why to pay more 
attention to users. Thirdly, the former points are partly related to that foresight, due to public 
budgetary strains, has come under increased pressure to focus on solutions for existing problems 
rather than future problems (P. D. Andersen & Rasmussen, 2012). The innovation-system approach 
has predominantly focused on understanding the evolution of innovation and identifying current 
barriers (Bergek, Hekkert, et al., 2008). It can give foresight tools for addressing such issues 
systematically and try to link current problems with future opportunities. 
 
Besides these specific points, it can be argued that the lack of theoretical underpinnings makes it 
difficult for foresight to be carried out systematically i.e. in coherence with a theoretical framework 
to support decisions before, during and after the foresight process. There is for example no 
theoretically founded reasoning behind delimitation of area of interest, selection of participants, 
criteria/design for understanding and analyzing the present situation11
 
. We argue that the 
innovation-system framework can supply some founding for such decision making and make it 
analytically coherent.  
The still growing diversity of disciplines, rationales, paradigms, designs, methodologies and 
approaches contained within the term foresight constitute a jungle full of extremely diverse 
animals12
                                                 
11 Often SWOT or STEEPV analyses are used but they are though practical not very informative regarding methodology, 
which hinders consistency and in turn reliability of the framework and methodology. This absence of a theoretical 
foundation also implies that there isn’t developed a convincing and systematic argument for how implementation should be 
carried out / ensured. All these factors have been mentioned before and are obvious in foresight practice, but they are not 
established in a coherent theoretical body.   
. Moreover, not all are explicitly related to innovation, and few to the innovation-system 
framework. Hence, there seems to be a need for conceptual clarification. The term ‘innovation 
foresight’ has been used occasionally. Porter describes innovation foresight as different from 
12 Obviously the diversity found in foresight can be a strength for grasping the diversity of the real world but the balance 
between diversity and generality is a delicate one. The innovation-system approach contains significant diversity within its 
framework that leaves some flexibility for adapting the analysis to the object of interest. 
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science foresight or technology foresight because it demands more attention to socio-economic 
contextual forces interacting with emerging technical capabilities to affect commercial product and 
services (Porter, 2010). 
 
Porter’s point is that innovation is different from and broader than science and technology, and that 
users play a more pronounced role. Still, it isn’t stressed that these dimensions of an innovation 
system are interdependent in a systemic way. The latter reflects that not all understandings of 
innovation are systemic. Thus, there is reason to be conceptually more precise. On this basis we 
propose the term ‘innovation-system foresight’ to describe foresight that is explicitly founded in the 
innovation-system framework13. Besides additional clarity, the concept imports the innovation-
system approach into foresight which, as argued above, has the potential address a number of 
research gaps in foresight. The latter will in turn make foresight more analytically and theoretically 
robust. Furthermore, it is more accurate than ‘innovation foresight’ because it stresses the systemic 
and process-like character of both foresight and innovation14
  
. Innovation-system foresight could be 
defined as a “systemic, systematic, participatory, future-intelligence-gathering and medium-to-long-
term vision-building process aimed at present-day decisions and mobilizing joint actions in order to 
improve innovation-system performance” (authors’ proposal). The previous literature review and 
current proposal imply that we can make interrelated distinctions between science, technology and 
innovation policy; between science, technology and innovation foresight; between generations of 
innovation models; and between generational models of foresight. An overview of these inter-
linkages can be seen in the table below.   
                                                 
13 These considerations imply that even though innovation-system foresight should be pursued science and technology 
foresight are complementary and valuable elements – if they are designed to pay attention to interactions between the 
science, technology and the innovation (are systemic). Otherwise, they can be everything from unproductive to harmful for 
innovation. Also, as foresight has evolved in direction of innovation-system foresight (4-5 generation) process benefits have 
become increasingly more important than product outputs as for example a list of priorities in science and technology. Such 
lists are still relevant but they should be derived an innovation-system foresight. A priority list without this embedding in a 
larger process is not valuable.  
14 Foresight is often defined as systematic but it is important to note that being systematic doesn’t imply being systemic. We 
thus emphasize that the word systemic ought to be clear from the definition of innovation-system foresight. 
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 Description of foresight generations  Conceptual rationale: understanding of 
innovation  
Type of innovation 
policy  
Structure/design  Label  
1 mainly forecasting  The science-push model of innovation  Science policy 
 
 
Mainly expert group driven. 
elitist 
Science 
foresight  
2 Emphasizes matching of technological 
opportunities with market and nonmarket 
(environment and social issues). 
The demand-pull and couplings model 
 
    
Technology policy    Increasingly involving firms 
and policy makers  
Technology 
foresight  
3 Signifies an enhancement, or broadening, of 
foresight’s market perspective by inclusion of a 
broader social dimension that involves concerns 
and inputs from a broad range of social actors.  
The demand-pull and couplings model 
The integrated model of innovation  
Technology policy    
Innovation policy  
Increasingly involving socio-
economic actors, more inter-
disciplinarily 
Foresight  
4 Foresight becomes distributed and broadened in 
scope. Intensifies characteristics of 3rd 
generation.  
The demand-pull and couplings model 
The integrated model of innovation  
The systems model 
Innovation policy Increasing diversity in terms 
of actors, levels, goals and 
designs 
Foresight  
5 Foresight becomes concerned with science and 
technology systems perspective and (or 
because of) increasing orientation towards 
solving societal challenges (grand challenges) 
The linear model of innovation.  
The demand-pull and chain-linked model 
The integrated model of innovation  
The systems and networking model 
Innovation-system approach  
Innovation policy Increasing diversity in terms 
of actors, levels, goals and 
designs 
Foresight  
Proposal: Focus on demand for knowledge, user-producer 
interaction, context factors and diversity in innovation 
dynamics. 
Innovation-system approach  Systemic Innovation 
policy 
System delimitation and nature 
structures design. 
Innovation-
system 
foresight  
Table 2: Conceptual linkages (developed by authors). 
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4 Discussion: implications of Innovation-system foresight 
A foresight can be described as consisting of three main phases: planning, execution and 
implementation. Each phase contains a number of steps as can be seen from figure 315
 
. The 
consequences of innovation-system foresight are direct in the planning phase and mapping the 
present and indirect for the remainder of the foresight. Therefore we will here discuss preliminary 
implications for: goal of foresight, system definition/boundaries, participation and mapping of the 
present. We will argue that the innovation-system framework can function as a focusing device for 
the design and process of foresight. One could argue that a horizon scanning not founded in an 
analytical framework (analytical glasses) would essentially be blind. Also, when one needs to 
define opportunities, threats, or bottlenecks one needs a base for coherently distinguishing between 
relevant and irrelevant factors. Hence, focus is not on impacts for methods or techniques of 
foresight but on conceptual design. 
Rationale/goal
‘System’ definition 
Motivation
Sponsor/finance 
Budget 
Duration  
Expected outcomes
(a) Preparation (b) Organization
Methods
Exclusive/inclusive
Management team 
Project team
Time horizon
1. PLANNING
Innovation system 
analysis (descriptive) 
Mapping / starting 
point (what is the 
situation now?)
Strenghts and 
weaknesses
(a) Mapping (b)’Foresighting’
Formulating and 
priortizing concrete
actions and 
instruments to 
realize identified
visions.
2. EXECUTION
Driving factors
Trends 
Vision building
Select key areas for 
action and give 
explain for choices
based on clear 
decision criteria
(c) Dissemination (d) Learning
Map outputs and 
outcomes.
Goal achievement.
Codify knowledge
for future use.
3. IMPLEMENTATION
(c) Prioritizing (d) Action plan 
Implementation of 
action plan.
Anchoring results
among participants.
Broad dissemination
of outputs.
 
Figure 3: Phases and steps in foresight – adopted and modified from (P. D. Andersen & Rasmussen, 2012) 
 
4.1 Goal of foresight    
According to Barré and Keenan the most common goals of foresight are: (1) Exploring future 
opportunities so as to set priorities for investment in science and innovation activities; (2) 
Reorienting the Science and Innovation System. This goal is related to priority setting but goes 
further. In such cases, there may have been a preliminary diagnosis that the science and innovation 
                                                 
15 It has been modified from general illustrational model of foresight to reflect ideas of innovation-system foresight. 
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system does not match the needs of the country; (3) Demonstrating the vitality of the Science and 
Innovation System. In this context foresight becomes a shop window to demonstrate the 
technological opportunities that are available; (4) Bringing new actors into the strategic debate. A 
growing tendency is the use of foresight as an instrument to broaden the range of actors engaged in 
science and innovation policy. One example is the inclusion of social stakeholders or even sections 
of the general public; (5) Building new networks and linkages across fields, sectors and markets or 
around problems (Barré & Keenan, 2008). A foresight can have one or several of these objectives 
which reflects diversity of theoretical foundations. 
 
From the perspective of innovation-system foresight it is possible to establish a hierarchy between 
the goals mentioned and eventually establish channels of causality between them. The most crucial 
objective of innovation-system foresight is to ‘strengthen’ the innovation system which involves 
building, transforming or reorienting the system by removing barriers to and promote learning and 
innovation activities. Building new networks and linkages, bringing new actors into the strategic 
debate, mapping (demonstrating) the’ vitality’ of the Science and Innovation System, and exploring 
future opportunities to set priorities for investment in science and innovation activities, are all 
instruments/means for achieving improvement of an innovation  system. These causalities can be 
illustrated as in figure 4. This implies that in order to be meaningful these instruments must be 
understood and designed as embedded in an innovation system – the systemic perspective must be 
applied. 
 
Figure 4: Hierarchy between goals of foresight (developed by authors). 
4.2 System definition: boundary setting  
According to our knowledge there is in foresight no agreed-upon method for setting system 
boundaries and thus deciding which factors are external and internal. This is problematic for 
developing a systematic foresight method based in theory, and for comparison between and 
generalization of foresight exercises16
 
. The setting of initial boundaries influences choice of 
methodology, data collection and stakeholder involvement in subsequent steps in the foresight 
process, and is thus a crucial step. 
                                                 
16 One could further argue that the latter is a precondition for cumulative scientific progress. 
Means of foresight 
•Exploring future opportunities so 
as to set priorities for investment 
in science and innovation 
activities.  
•Demonstrating the vitality of the 
Science and Innovation System 
•Bringing new actors into the 
strategic debate.  
•Building new networks and 
linkages across fields, sectors and 
markets or around problems. 
Immediate goal 
 
 
•Transforming the Innovation 
system 
Ultimate goal  
 
 
•Economic growth, internatinal 
competitiveness, development 
and social well-being 
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Innovation-system foresight should follow the definition innovation system as the organizing 
principle for setting boundaries. The system should include the elements and relationships which 
interact in the production, diffusion and use of new, and economically useful knowledge. The main 
point here is to have basic principles (based in theory) for how to set the boundaries, and explicitly 
argue for why they were decided as they were. There is flexibility in and debate about how such 
boundaries are decided which is reflected by the diversity of innovation-system types (RIS, TIS, 
SSI and NIS). Still, embedded in these system types and the discussions around them is the 
accumulated knowledge about how to best understand innovation in certain contexts which can be 
valuable to foresight. Since innovation systems are open, interdependency and interaction between 
system levels and dimensions must be at the centre. 
4.3 Participation: diversity and volume 
Which actors are considered relevant is closely related to where the system boundaries are set. 
Since we are considering an innovation system, system transformation requires distributed policy 
which in turn requires (meaningful) participation of all key stakeholders. In general it can be said 
that one should make sure that those who are responsible for making the decisions necessary for 
achieving the desired change are involved throughout the foresight process such that they feel a 
sense of ownership of its results (Cagnin, 2011). If the goal is innovation-system transformation, an 
expert-based foresight will be insufficient – even if systemic. Innovation-system foresight is more 
in line with a ‘inclusive foresight’ where actors in the innovation system are mobilized (Loveridge, 
2005). Hence, innovation-system foresight is both systemic and distributed. 
 
We can distinguish between diversity and volume of participants. Diversity refers to representation 
of elements, actors and relationships relevant for innovation processes in a given system (we will 
explore the further in the next section). Volume refers to degree of representation. The larger the 
number of participants, the more robust the output may be due to the increased diversity of and 
competition between ideas. A balance must be found in any concrete case. The main point here is 
that because actors are seen as the primary agents of change innovation-system foresight must be 
‘inclusive’ (Loveridge, 2005) to be transformational. 
4.4 Mapping the present  
According to our knowledge there is in foresight no agreed-upon method for analyzing the present 
and give a deep understanding of the system for which foresight will be carried out. SWOT and 
STEEPV analyses are often used but they are not based in a coherent theoretical framework nor do 
they give explicit guidelines for analysis. This hinders consistency and in turn reliability of the 
framework and methodology. Moreover, these frameworks are not developed to grasp innovation 
processes, and are thus weak in this respect. It is therefore an important step because the quality of 
any foresight will depend on the quality of the initial mapping exercise. Innovation-system foresight 
demands analysis of the innovation system’s current state with focus on barriers and opportunities 
for innovation. The processual nature of evolutionary analysis implies that the present can only be 
understood by understanding how we arrived there (Langlois, 1986). Complementary historical 
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analysis will most likely be required. The issues identified could appropriately be used as 
organizing topics for the further foresight process.   
 
The ‘functional approach’ to innovation systems is very useful as an operational framework for 
analyzing the present (Bergek, Hekkert, et al., 2008; Bergek, Jacobsson, & Sandén, 2008; 
Jacobsson, 2004; Jacobsson & Bergek, 2007, 2011). Its usefulness stems from that the approach 
contains a relatively well-specified guide map for conducting innovation-system analysis which 
contains tools for grasping synergies between various innovative activities. The basic ideas are 
summarized in figure 5. The first step is to define the innovation system of interest on the basis of 
inter alia research objective, breadth and depth, and spatial domain. The second step is to identify 
structural components of the system such as actors, networks and institutions. The third step is to 
map the key functions of the system. Fourth and fifth steps imply assessing the functioning of the 
system, and identify inducement and blocking mechanism. This information can in turn be used for 
formulating policy to improve the system (step six).    
 
 
Figure 5: mapping the present (Bergek, Jacobsson et al. 2008). 
 
In contrast to some earlier work in innovation-system research the functional approach is more 
focused on what is going on – the functions or processes – within systems rather than their 
structural and institutional features (Bergek, Jacobsson et al. 2008). The latter is accommodated by 
an analytical distinction between components (actors, networks, infrastructure and institutions) and 
processes in the system, which also implies a distinction between structural and process dynamics17
                                                 
17 It is important to note that the distinction is analytical and not empirical. In any specific context a complete separation 
between changes in components and ongoing activities would not be possible. 
 
(Jacobsson and Bergek 2007). On the basis of a literature survey of past research using the 
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innovation-system approach the authors identify seven key functions that is central to performance 
of an innovation system. They acknowledge that the list of key processes is not finite, and should be 
applied with open-mindedness with respect to that contextual conditions always differ to some 
extent. Moreover, the authors focus on technological innovation systems but the analytic framework 
can in principle be applied to any type of innovation system. 
 
This mapping will serve as a basis for foresighting in the following steps. How the details of the 
analysis should be done is beyond the scope of this paper.  
5 Concluding remarks 
The brief reviews of innovation studies and foresight research illustrated that changes in the two 
areas have co-evolved over the years with foresight importing the dominant understanding of 
innovation from innovation studies with a time lag. Currently foresight is in a catching-up process 
vis-à-vis innovation studies – more specifically with incorporating the implications of a systemic 
understanding of innovation. The latter is one reason for considering a closer integration between 
foresight and the innovation-system framework.  
 
We also showed that there are research frontiers within foresight that points to a further integration 
between the two areas. One prominent reason is the search for theoretical foundations for foresight 
to which we have recommended moving in direction of innovation-system foresight. By integrating 
further with the innovation-system framework, foresight is able to move towards firmer theoretical 
underpinnings which in turn allow it to become more analytically coherent. Also, experience with 
foresight shows that taking into account idiosyncratic contextual factors (institutions, infrastructure, 
geography, climate, history, etc.) and the demand-side in innovation would yield significant 
improvements. We have illustrated that the innovation-system approach have tools available for 
addressing these needs that can be imported. 
 
We have proposed the concept of innovation-system foresight as a natural next step in the 
communication between the innovation-system approach and foresight. We considered four 
preliminary implications. Firstly, the goal of foresight is innovation-system transformation 
(improvement). Secondly, the innovation-system approach gives foresight a framework for 
analytically setting the boundaries for the system of interest, which has otherwise been done in an 
ad hoc fashion. Thirdly, because innovation-system actors are seen as agents of change and because 
systemic innovation policy must be distributed, innovation-system foresight must be inclusive. 
Inclusiveness should be organized according to the elements, actors and relationships that affect 
learning and innovation in the system of interest. Identifying these elements and actors is the first 
step in the innovation-system analysis. Fourthly, the innovation-system framework can supply 
foresight with an innovation-oriented analytical framework for mapping and understanding the 
present situation, which will serve as a basis for foresighting activities. There are huge diversity and 
ad-hoc solutions in mapping exercises in foresight. Even though such diversity can be seen as a 
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strength, it complicates comparison, generalization and ultimately analytical progress. We have 
suggested the innovation-system framework as a basic, analytically coherent framework for 
understanding innovation dynamics (in the case the functional approach to innovation systems). 
 
Our considerations are of theoretical nature and the implications sketched concern the perception of 
foresight and the planning of foresight. Still, there are other less direct implications. Since the goal 
of innovation-system foresight is innovation-system transformation, actual change is a criterion for 
success which makes the (policy) implementation step crucial. This is an area where the innovation-
system framework doesn’t have much to say except that it is very important.   
 
The innovation-system foresight process must cover the interdependent dimensions of science, 
technology and innovation, and identify the synergies and barriers to their interaction. This must be 
done with equal attention to users and producers of knowledge, and context parameters. 
Representatives for all elements, actors and relationships of importance for innovation and learning 
should be included in the foresight process in reasonable volume. In its core, innovation-system 
foresight carries a critique of both science foresight and technology foresight (even if systemic), 
because these setups will find it difficult to identify actors in the demand side with whom to 
interact. The absence of concrete recipients or users of technological developments undermines the 
effectiveness of foresight by (a) removing the possibility of interactive learning and feedback loops, 
and (b) by not enrolling down-stream agents of change that are needed for achieving (sustainable) 
innovation-system transformation because they are able to block later developments. Still, there are 
situations where a ‘technological innovation-system foresight’ is relevant. It will mainly concern 
technologically radical innovations. This discussion is a point for further research.    
 
Furthermore, the focus on demand that we suggest is different from the demand-focus related to the 
notion of grand social challenges. Consider two foresights. One consists of an expert group which 
analyzes which technologies will be critical for international competitiveness in 20 years. Another 
consists of a group of experts analyzes which social needs will dominate in 20 years, and 
subsequently which technologies will be in demand due to the latter. Ontologically speaking, the 
two foresights are not so different. Both processes are exclusive and non-transformational with 
respect to the innovation system. They analyze the demand side but do not include it. In innovation-
system foresight neither scientific progress nor technological R&D can generate ready-made 
‘optimal’ innovations regardless of how detailed an analysis of future demand is made. Only 
solutions that match technological opportunities, user competence and preference, and context 
idiosyncrasies can be considered desirable/sustainable18
 
. The latter requires inclusive processes of 
interactive learning and vision building. 
                                                 
18 One may argue that the focus on Grand Social Challenges stems from the increased pressure on public science to yield 
higher social returns by addressing social problems. It does not stem from the insight that demand-side inclusion in long-
term policy-making processes is needed to make it effective. 
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The arguments presented in this paper merely constitute a first tentative step towards initiating a 
constructive dialogue between foresight and the innovation-system approach. 
 
We have not discussed any implications for foresight methods but the centrality of interactive 
learning may suggest that face-to-face interaction may be a crucial element in achieving shared 
visions and in turn effective distributed policy. Another implication is that the type of foresight 
suggested requires additional skills from foresight managers. Conducting the innovation-system 
analysis demands skilled efforts, and foresighting on the basis of its outcome, will be a complex 
task. The paper points toward several areas of future research. One is to develop in more detail how 
to actually do the innovation-system analysis and how to integrate the results with the foresighting 
activities. Also, implications for foresight methods can be explored further. The development of 
systemic methods (Saritas, 2011) seems a fruitful path to follow. 
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